Chapter 4

Tailwinds and Peers

Indonesia's property incentives for 2025 and 2026 cover landed houses and apartments priced up to Rp5 billion. Four-fifths of CBDK's 2025 order intake was bare commercial land, and residential was 0.9% of it. Three listed developers running the same year under the same policy moved between plus 3.4% and minus 22.8%; CBDK fell 79.7%. The tailwind that is genuinely CBDK's is local — PIK2 infrastructure and the NICE venue — and it has not yet reached order intake.

The tailwinds management names

CBDK's FY2025 annual report sets out an explicitly favourable backdrop. It cites Real Estate Indonesia's projection that the property sector could grow 8% in 2026, driven by the extension of the government-borne value-added tax relief on housing to 2027, falling interest rates, and the disbursement of subsidised People's Business Credit for housing [1]. It quotes broker research describing the sector outlook into 2026 as "stellar", supported by tax incentives for middle- and lower-segment housing and lower mortgage rates [2]. The macro frame is supportive too: Indonesian GDP growth of 5.11% in 2025, a policy rate held at 4.75%, and Bank Indonesia data showing national residential sales up 0.73% year on year [3].

The report's own regulatory table names the mechanism: Ministry of Finance Regulation 13/2025, which grants government-borne VAT on the transfer of landed houses and apartment units in fiscal 2025 within stated criteria and price ceilings. CBDK describes the effect on itself as potentially raising interest in buying residential property in its development area [4].

That is an accurate description of the policy. It is also a description of a policy aimed at a part of CBDK's business that barely exists.

What the incentives actually cover

The relief has a shape. Ciputra Development, one of the four listed competitors CBDK named in its own prospectus, sets it out on a single slide: VAT exemption for houses, shophouses and apartments priced up to Rp5.0 billion per unit, exempting the VAT on the first Rp2.0 billion of value, at 100% for January to December 2026 [5]. Ciputra also discloses how much of its order intake the relief actually touches: Rp2,705 billion of its Rp9,461 billion of 2025 marketing sales were VAT-exempted units, or 28.6%, against 27.1% in 2024 [6].

CBDK's 2025 order intake breaks down differently. Of Rp430,186 million of marketing sales, Rp343,508 million — 79.9% — was commercial land plots, bare land that a housing VAT exemption does not reach. Commercial products, the shop-office and SOHO formats where some units could fall under the ceiling, were Rp83,001 million, or 19.3%. Residential was Rp3,676 million: 0.9% of the year's intake [7]. The single policy CBDK's own filing names as its regulatory tailwind applies most directly to the segment that produced under one per cent of what it sold.

That is not a criticism of the products. Commercial land sold in bulk to corporates is a legitimate and high-margin way to monetise a land bank. It does mean the national demand story that supports peer intake — mortgage rates, VAT relief, the three-million-homes programme, subsidised housing credit — is largely not CBDK's demand story, and a reader who takes the sector forecast as a proxy for CBDK's order book will be reading the wrong indicator.

The same year, at four other developers

The cleanest test of whether 2025 was a sector problem is what happened to the sector. Bumi Serpong Damai, Ciputra Development and Alam Sutera Realty all publish order intake for the same calendar year, in the same country, under the same incentive regime.

Sources: year-on-year change in marketing sales — BSDE FY2025 Annual Report [8]; CTRA FY2025 results presentation [9]; ASRI FY2025 and FY2024 Annual Reports [10] [11]; CBDK FY2025 Annual Report [12].

Bumi Serpong Damai grew presales 3.35% to Rp10.04 trillion and beat the Rp10.00 trillion target it set at the start of the year [13]. Ciputra fell 14.1%, to Rp9,461 billion from Rp11,017 billion, and landed at 95% of a revised target [14]. Alam Sutera fell 22.8%, from Rp3,158 billion to Rp2,439 billion, reaching 70% of its target [15] [16]. CBDK fell 79.7% [17].

The national picture behind those numbers is soft, not broken. Lippo Karawaci, reading the same Bank Indonesia residential survey CBDK cites, reports that the primary-market price index grew about 1% year on year in the fourth quarter of 2025 and that primary residential sales were still contracting year on year, though at a slower pace than the quarter before [18]. A flat-to-slightly-negative market is what the peer spread of plus 3.4% to minus 22.8% describes. It does not describe an 80% fall.

Sources: CBDK FY2025 Annual Report, operational highlights and target tables [19] [20] [21]; BSDE FY2025 Annual Report [22] [23]; CTRA FY2025 and Q1 2026 results presentations [24] [25]; ASRI FY2025 and FY2024 Annual Reports [26] [27]. BSDE's 2024 intake is derived from the disclosed 3.35% growth rate; CTRA's 2025 target is the revised figure the company reported against.

The read this supports: CBDK's 2025 order-intake collapse is a company-and-product event, not the Indonesian property cycle. The evidence is that three developers exposed to the same rates, the same VAT relief and the same consumer, in the same twelve months, printed intake changes an order of magnitude smaller.

The strongest fact against that read is scale. In its own prospectus CBDK put itself alongside four listed competitors, none of them close to its size.

Source: CBDK IPO prospectus, section 22.5 Persaingan Usaha, competitor financial data at 30 June 2024 [28].

Ciputra sold 5,065 units in 2025 across projects in Greater Jakarta, Surabaya, other Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi [29]; CBDK sells sixteen products inside one district [30]. Rp430 billion of intake is 4.5% of Ciputra's. At that scale a single large commercial land-plot transaction moves the whole year: land plots alone were Rp1,489 billion of CBDK's 2024 intake and Rp835 billion of its 2023 intake [31]. Lumpiness is a real and sufficient explanation for a large percentage swing in a small book, and the 2024 base itself included affiliate purchases that did not repeat (Ownership and Affiliates). What lumpiness does not explain is why the shortfall persisted across all three segments at once, or why the company reset its own target rather than treating the year as a timing gap (CBD PIK2 Economics).

The tailwind that is local

CBDK has a demand argument that does not depend on national housing policy, and it is the more relevant one. The company describes North Tangerang, where PIK2 sits, as one of Indonesia's largest property-growth centres, contributing roughly 17% of national demand, with NICE and the Hilton PIK2 hotel named as the catalysts enhancing the area's appeal [32]. Access is being rebuilt around it: the Kataraja toll road connects the PIK2 area to Soekarno-Hatta international airport [33], with two toll gates shown feeding the CBD directly [34].

The MICE venue is real and running. NICE completed at about 54,560 square metres with capacity for up to 100,000 visitors and began operating in August 2025 [35], partially operational from that month and expected to be fully operational in early 2026 [36]. The February 2026 presentation carries something closer to a demand signal than anything else in the filings: a booked calendar running from a Westlife gala on 10 February and a Michael Jackson production in April [37], through the Hammersonic festival, Java Jazz, and the Keramika Indonesia and Megabuild trade fairs in May and June [38], to a Kahitna anniversary concert and the Carabao International Open in September [39].

The industry backdrop for that pivot is the weakest part of the picture. Lippo Karawaci reports that average star-rated hotel occupancy fell to 47.21% in February 2025 from 49.45% a year earlier, with sector revenue down, and attributes part of the pressure to a contraction in MICE demand from the government sector after budget tightening on official travel and events [40]. CBDK is opening Indonesia's largest convention venue and a 271-room Hilton [41] into a hospitality market the nearest listed operator describes as contracting. A booked calendar of concerts and trade fairs is a corporate and consumer revenue base rather than a government one, which is the right side of that particular squeeze — but no filing in the corpus discloses attendance, hall utilisation, or the rate NICE charges, so the calendar is evidence of activity and not yet evidence of economics.

What the 2026 plan requires

The 2026 target makes the demand question concrete. CBDK is guiding to Rp563,054 million of marketing sales, 30.9% above 2025 realisation. The composition matters more than the total.

Source: CBDK FY2025 Annual Report, comparison of 2025 realization with 2026 projections [42].

Commercial land plots are targeted 6.0% higher and commercial products 2.5% higher. Residential is targeted at Rp114,000 million against Rp3,676 million realised — thirty-one times the 2025 outcome, and 83% of the entire planned increase in order intake [43]. Residential was also the segment that missed hardest in 2025: Rp3,676 million against a Rp10,000 million target [44].

Read alongside the peers, that is an unusual plan. Bumi Serpong Damai left its 2026 target unchanged at Rp10 trillion, describing it as a moderate view of demand [45]. Ciputra set Rp9,487 billion, 0.3% above 2025, and booked Rp2,446 billion in the March quarter against Rp3,156 billion a year earlier [46]. Alam Sutera guided to Rp2.8 trillion, 14.8% above a year in which it hit 70% of plan [47]. CBDK is guiding to the largest percentage increase in the group, concentrated in the segment where it has the least commercial history and the weakest 2025 record — and, unlike Ciputra, it publishes no quarterly order-intake figure against which a reader could mark that plan to market.

One disclosure detail belongs with the numbers. The English narrative on page 121 attributes the 95.08% achievement to residential, 60.68% to commercial land plots and 36.76% to commercial products; the Indonesian text on the same page and the target table on page 120 both assign 95.08% to commercial land plots, 60.68% to commercial products and 36.76% to residential [48] [49]. The tables govern. An English-language reader relying on the narrative would conclude that residential was the year's strongest segment when it was the weakest, and would misjudge the 2026 plan accordingly.

What would change the read

Three observable things would move this assessment materially. A half-year or full-year 2026 intake print showing commercial land plots back at the Rp300–400 billion pace of 2024 would convert 2025 into a timing gap rather than a demand break. Residential intake tracking anywhere near the Rp114,000 million target through 2026 would show the new segment is being built rather than assumed. And any disclosure of NICE utilisation, event revenue or hall rates would let the recurring-income pivot be judged on economics instead of a booking calendar.

Against that, the prospectus itself flags what would push the other way: CBDK identifies weakening consumer purchasing power as the principal risk to its business continuity, and competition for the same middle- and upper-income buyer as its main business risk [50]. Those are the risks the whole listed peer group carries. On the evidence of 2025, they are not what separated CBDK from it.