Chapter 2

Bottom line

CBDK's cash flow statement crossed over in 2025. Cash received from customers fell to Rp2,326 billion from Rp3,274 billion while recognised revenue rose to Rp2,504 billion [1] — the first year the company booked more revenue than it collected [2]. In the March 2026 quarter the gap widened and operating cash flow turned negative, at minus Rp131 billion against Rp546 billion of reported profit [3].

Cash in, revenue out

The reported profit and loss account for 2023 to 2025 is a clean upward line, and the orientation chapter sets it out. The cash flow statement tells a different story, and it is the more informative of the two for a business that collects money years before it recognises revenue.

Because CBDK sells on an indent basis, the cash flow line "receipt from customers" is close to a direct measure of commercial activity in the period: it is money physically arriving from buyers, whether against a plot sold last month or an instalment on one sold three years ago. Recognised revenue, by contrast, is the release of earlier collections onto the income statement when a unit is handed over. The difference between the two is the direction the advances pool is travelling.

Sources: FY2025 receipts and the FY2024 restated comparative from the FY2025 consolidated cash flow statement [4]; FY2023 receipts from the audited FY2023 statements [5]; revenue from the FY2025 Financial Highlights [6].

In 2023 the company took in Rp1,146 billion more from customers than it recognised. In 2024, Rp1,025 billion more. In 2025 the sign flipped: Rp178 billion less [7] [8] [9]. The balance sheet agrees: advances from customers fell to Rp9,547 billion at end-2025 from Rp9,937 billion a year earlier [10].

The March 2026 quarter extends the trend rather than breaking it. Revenue of Rp743 billion was 74% higher year on year and gross profit rose 159% [11], and profit attributable to shareholders rose to Rp541 billion from Rp130 billion, an EPS of Rp95.58 against Rp22.92 [12]. Cash received from customers in the same three months was Rp279 billion, down from Rp815 billion a year earlier [13]. The Rp464 billion shortfall against recognised revenue is almost exactly the Rp465 billion by which the advances pool shrank in the quarter, to Rp9,082 billion [14]. The two statements are describing the same event from opposite sides.

Profit converted to cash

Source: derived from operating cash flow of Rp966.8 bn, Rp1,730.3 bn and Rp719.4 bn and profit for the year of Rp804.5 bn, Rp1,095.6 bn and Rp1,467.3 bn, FY2023–FY2025 [15] [16], and from Q1 2026 operating cash flow of minus Rp130.9 bn against profit of Rp546.2 bn [17] [18].

For two years operating cash flow ran ahead of accounting profit — 120% of it in 2023, 158% in 2024. In 2025 it covered 49%. In the March 2026 quarter it covered none of it [19] [20]. That pattern is what a pre-collected order book looks like when it is being drawn down faster than it is being refilled; it is not, on this evidence, a receivables or a working-capital problem, since CBDK carries almost no trade receivables at all [21].

Sources: FY2024 and FY2025 from the consolidated cash flow statement [22] and the three-year summary [23]; FY2023 from the audited FY2023 statements [24]; Q1 2026 from the interim statements [25].

One comparability note the table cannot show. The FY2024 column was restated during 2025 when CBDK acquired PT Industri Pameran Nusantara from an entity under common control and applied pooling-of-interests accounting, which the auditor flagged in an emphasis-of-matter paragraph [26]. The restatement added Rp1,188 billion to end-2024 total assets, matched almost exactly by additional liabilities of Rp1,194 billion, and left revenue and earnings per share unchanged [27]. The FY2023 column was not restated — the visible tell is that closing cash for 2023 is Rp288 billion while opening cash for 2024 is Rp294 billion, the Rp6 billion difference being the acquired entity's cash [28].

Management's explanation

The FY2025 management discussion attributes the 58.43% fall in operating cash flow to one cause: an increase in payments to suppliers of Rp228.92 billion, or 17.59% [29]. That figure is accurate and it is the right sign, but it accounts for roughly a fifth of the decline. Cash generated from operations before interest and tax fell Rp1,192 billion, from Rp1,819 billion to Rp627 billion, and Rp948 billion of that — four-fifths — came from the drop in receipts from customers, which the cash flow discussion does not mention [30] [31]. The number a reader needs is in the statements; it is not in the narrative that explains them.

Where the money went

Cash fell Rp358 billion during 2025 even after Rp2.30 trillion of IPO proceeds arrived, because Rp2,115 billion went out through investing [32] [33]. Against the property spend, 2025 was the first year of negative free cash flow in the record: Rp719 billion of operating cash flow, less Rp1,148 billion of investment-property purchases and Rp164 billion of fixed assets, is minus Rp593 billion. The March quarter added another minus Rp257 billion on the same basis [34] [35].

Most of that spending is the MICE and hospitality build-out: investment property additions of Rp1,720 billion in 2025, with the entire Rp2,586 billion of assets under construction transferred into completed buildings during the year, taking net investment property to Rp2,562 billion [36]. One item is different in kind. On 21 October 2025 CBDK placed Rp850 billion, in two equal tranches, into long-term bonds issued by PT Danantara Investment Management (Persero), described in the notes as "Patriot Bond" Series A and Series B, carrying interest of 2% per annum and maturing in October 2030 and October 2032 [37]. That is 37% of net IPO proceeds committed for five and seven years at 2%, by a company whose own bank facilities cost between 6.50% and 9.00% [38]. The bonds are carried at amortised cost equal to nominal value, and the fair-value note states that the fair value of the Group's financial assets approximates carrying value "as the effect of discounting is not material" — a statement that now covers a five-to-seven-year instrument yielding a third of what the company pays its own banks [39] [40]. Discounted at 6.5% — the lowest rate CBDK itself pays, and so the most generous assumption available from its own filings — the two tranches are worth in the region of Rp665 billion rather than Rp850 billion. That is my arithmetic, not a company disclosure; the filings offer no separate valuation of the instrument.

A second, quieter drain sits in current assets. Prepaid taxes reached Rp1,013 billion at end-2025, from Rp864 billion and Rp712 billion in the two prior years, of which Rp773 billion is unrecovered value-added tax [41]. At 31 March 2026 the balance was Rp1,020 billion [42]. That is cash already paid to the tax authority, equal to 69% of FY2025 group profit, sitting on the balance sheet pending refund or offset, and it has grown every year in the record.

Whose profit it is

Group profit and profit attributable to shareholders have moved at different speeds, and the gap is not small. Between 2023 and 2025 profit for the year rose Rp662 billion, from Rp805 billion to Rp1,467 billion. Profit attributable to owners of the parent rose Rp786 billion, from Rp579 billion to Rp1,364 billion, because the parent's share of group profit went from 71.9% to 93.0% as non-controlling interests fell from Rp226 billion to Rp103 billion [43]. Held at the 2023 share, FY2025 profit to shareholders would have been about Rp1,055 billion. On that arithmetic roughly Rp309 billion — 39% of the two-year increase in shareholder profit, and Rp55 of the Rp128 increase in EPS — came from owning more of the same group rather than from the group earning more. What CBDK paid the sellers, and to whom, is a separate question the filings answer only in part; it belongs in a chapter of its own.

What "net cash" does and does not cover

For a reader whose first screen is solvency, the headline numbers are reassuring and mostly earned. Borrowings were Rp249 billion at end-2025 against Rp3,121 billion of cash, so net cash of Rp2,872 billion and a gearing ratio the company reports as nil [44]. Interest cover is 50 times, and management states plainly that as of end-2025 no financial-ratio covenants applied under any of its loan agreements [45]. At 31 March 2026, cash of Rp2,745 billion against borrowings of Rp234 billion leaves Rp2,512 billion of net cash, and equity attributable to shareholders of Rp9,506 billion [46] [47]. There is no maturity wall here and no lender who can force the issue.

Two qualifications belong next to those numbers. First, the ratio the performance highlights label "Liabilities to Equity" is 0.02, which is borrowings over equity; total liabilities of Rp10,594 billion against equity of Rp11,982 billion is 0.88 [48] [49]. Second, Rp8,411 billion of the Rp9,547 billion advances balance was classified current at end-2025, against Rp7,648 billion a year earlier, while the non-current portion halved to Rp1,136 billion [50]. The company is telling the reader it expects to hand over, and therefore build and deliver, substantially more within twelve months. The current ratio of 1.20 and quick ratio of 0.45 are calculated against that reclassified obligation [51]. The claim ranking ahead of shareholders is a construction obligation to buyers, not a coupon.

The company has also started buying its own shares. Between 3 February and 31 March 2026 it repurchased 11,257,600 shares for Rp61.3 billion — an average of about Rp5,444 a share, against the Rp3,760 close on 23 July 2026 — using the OJK provision that permits buybacks without a shareholder meeting in significantly fluctuating market conditions [52].

The forward view is one analyst deep

There is effectively no consensus to lean on. One analyst submits estimates: FY2026 EPS of Rp226 and revenue of Rp2,812 billion, against FY2025 reported EPS of Rp241.45. One independent data provider states outright that coverage is insufficient to forecast growth and two others carry no price target or consensus at all, and the aggregated twelve-month target of Rp13,700 is a single unrevised number that has not moved with a share price that has more than halved [53].

Sources: estimates, target price and broker range from the consensus summary [54]; FY2025 EPS [55]; Q1 2026 EPS annualised from Rp95.58 for the quarter [56]; company target from the FY2025 marketing sales plan [57]; share price from market data as reported.

The spread inside that table is the useful part. The single aggregated estimate implies FY2026 EPS slightly below FY2025, which puts the shares on about 16.6 times forward earnings at Rp3,760; the March quarter alone, annualised, implies Rp382 and about 9.8 times. Named local brokers sit between Rp3,500 and Rp13,100 — a range of nearly four times on the same company [58]. The company's own forward commitment is not an earnings number at all: a 2026 marketing sales target of Rp563 billion [59]. Because revenue is released from a pool collected earlier, reported earnings and current order intake can diverge for years, which is precisely why the two forward anchors available point in different directions.

How this reads

On the evidence above, the earnings acceleration through 2025 and into 2026 is being funded out of the balance sheet rather than out of current trading. That is a legitimate way to run an indent-sale developer and it is fully disclosed in the primary statements; it is not a fraud pattern, and there is no lender in a position to force anything. What it does mean is that the profit line and the cash line have decoupled, and only one of them can carry on indefinitely.

The strongest fact against reading it as deterioration is timing. Handovers are lumpy, a single quarter's collections say little, and the pool at 31 March 2026 was still Rp9,082 billion — more than three years of FY2025 revenue [60]. A single large collection in a later quarter would flip the sign back. The reclassification of Rp1.15 trillion of advances from non-current to current also suggests management expects a heavy delivery year, which mechanically front-loads recognition without implying weak demand.

Two observations would change the read. Receipts from customers recovering above recognised revenue for two consecutive quarters would say the crossover was a delivery-schedule artefact. Receipts staying near the Q1 2026 level through the half-year statements, due at the end of July 2026 [61], would put the drawdown on a footing where the pool, not the market, is setting the pace of reported earnings — and the company's own Rp563 billion order-intake target would then be the binding constraint rather than a formality.